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         Abstract: 
In this dissertation, we study the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
performance and Financial Distress, between 2007 and 2017 in a Southern European context. 
In order to assess this association, ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) Scores are 
used as proxies for CSR performance, while three different measures are employed in 
representation of Financial Distress levels, including Altman-Z Score. Based on sample of 115 
publicly listed Southern European companies we find that firms with higher levels of positive 
CSR performance are less likely to fall into situations of Financial Distress. In addition, the 
results also remain robust after mitigating endogeneity through the use of the instrumental 
variable technique. Finally, the results evidence that three dimensions of ESG (Environmental, 
Social and Corporate Governance) have similar significant relationships with Financial 
Distress. Environmental and Corporate Governance performance are negatively linked with 
Financial Distress, however the contradictory results for Social Performance indicate that is not 
possible to establish a well-defined relationship between this ESG dimension and Financial 
Distress. In our context, we are able to conduct an investigation in a European region known 
for experiencing high levels of Financial Distress but also low levels of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, when compared with other European regions.    
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         Abstrato: 
Nesta dissertação, estudamos a relação entre o desempenho da Responsabilidade Social 
Empresarial (RSE) e as Dificuldades Financeiras, entre 2007 e 2017 em um contexto Sul 
Europeu. Para avaliar esta associação as pontuações de ESG (Ambiental, Social e Governança 
Corporativa) são utilizados como representativos para o desempenho da RSE, enquanto três 
medidas diferentes são empregadas em representação dos níveis de Dificuldades Financeiras, 
incluindo o Altman-Z Score. Com base em uma amostra de 115 empresas Sul Europeias listadas 
publicamente, descobrimos que empresas com níveis mais altos de desempenho positivo em 
RSE têm menor probabilidade de cair em situações de Dificuldades Financeiras. 
Adicionalmente, os resultados permanecem robustos após mitigar a endogeneidade através do 
uso da técnica da variável instrumental. Por fim, os resultados evidenciam que as três dimensões 
de ESG revelam relações significativas semelhantes com as Dificuldades Financeiras. O 
desempenho Ambiental e o da Governança Corporativa estão negativamente relacionados com 
as Dificuldades Financeiras, porém os resultados contraditórios do desempenho Social indicam 
que não é possível estabelecer uma relação bem definida entre esta dimensão de ESG e as 
Dificuldades Financeiras. Neste contexto, somos capazes de realizar uma investigação em uma 
região Europeia, conhecida por altos níveis de Dificuldades Financeiras, como também, baixos 
níveis de Responsabilidade Social Empresarial, quando comparada com outras regiões 
europeias.    
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Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become a competitive factor for businesses and 
firms all over the world. The competitiveness of a company used to be set through the price of 
its products and the convenience of the offer. Negative externalities and effects in the form of 
product characteristics and manufacturing processes were disregarded, with corporate 
reputation and image also being a relatively low priority for consumers. In the contemporary 
world however, it is well established that organizations must invest permanently in relationships 
with all stakeholders: customers, suppliers, employees and partners. These relationships further 
include the community in which it operates, the government, and society at large. Currently, 
the immensity of recent and ongoing events, such as the global financial crisis or climate 
change, have raised serious social concerns and further increased public interest in social, 
environmental, ethical and financial effects and outcomes (Galbreath, 2013). Even though CSR 
is a controversial concept in the academic and business atmosphere, a substantial consensus has 
emerged that defends that it is a fundamental strategy for achieving the sustainable development 
that our globalized world needs (Souto, 2009). Incorporating and demonstrating CSR strategies 
and performances is itself a challenging prospect. Firms and corporations require increased 
power and influence in order to tackle the innumerous needs and expectations of a wide variety 
of stakeholders. Consequently, they face new challenges that are brought about by that very 
same increased dominance and influence. These can include a duty to manage their resources 
in a way that considers not only financial profits and economic efficiency, but also account for 
social and environmental demands, satisfying the needs of a new and wide range of 
stakeholders. The exponential development of technology and faster access to information has 
fostered general knowledge regarding corporate scandals and large business failures. These 
inevitably lead to a negative perception of businesses and corporations becoming ingrained in 
consumer’s minds and those of their governments. This may translate into heavy losses, not 
only economically, but also in reputation, which may itself result in socially implicit consumer 
embargos, political and media pressure, or even government fines.  
 
In the recent years, several researchers have attempted to gain a greater understanding of the 
relation between Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Distress, but such studies are a 
relatively rare sight within the literature. (Deegan, 2002). The relationship between CSR 
performance and Financial Distress has in fact been largely eclipsed by the much larger body 
of study on the relationship between CSR and financial performance. Al-Hadi et al. (2017)’s 
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work provides some empirical evidence confirming the negative association between CSR 
performance and a firm’s probability of being under financial duress, an analysis dependent on 
the use of firms’ life-cycle stages as a moderating factor. This approach compares to Goss 
(2009), whose work confirms Al-Hadi’s findings through the use of both multivariate 
regressions and a discrete time hazard model instead. 
 
The importance of this study has been increasingly debated within the literature. The consensus 
is increasing among researchers which has only further increased public curiosity and concern 
regarding the impact of environmental, social and governmental decisions and their effects. The 
past fifty years have seen an increase in the attention given to the subject of CSR within 
academia. The majority of the primary studies performed during this period have found a 
positive association between firms’ probability of facing risks associated with Financial 
Distress and CSR investments. These findings have led to subsequent arguments that 
investment in CSR strategy are risky and expose companies to unpredicted economic 
difficulties. Such studies support the agency theory promoted by Friedman (1970), purporting 
that profit intensification is the primary obligation of private companies. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) further argue that the creation of a confident image within public media is the principal 
incentive behind managers’ responsible practices. Nevertheless, there is a trend within recent 
studies towards agreement with stakeholder theory. According to Jiao (2010)’s work, CSR 
expenditures are beneficial in the long-term, generating intangible assets, such as status or 
goodwill, and thereby enriching organizations in terms of account purposes and values. In order 
to preserve their market share, it is fundamental for enterprises to engagement in CSR behaviors 
that fulfill customers’ and society’s expectations (Rexhepi et al, 2013). In 2013, Rexhepi et al. 
(2013) described the importance of CSR as follows: “CSR is not just what to do with your 
money but how to make your money.” 
 
This thesis aims to analyze and understand the impact of CSR performance on a firm’s 
likelihood of entering into situations of Financial Distress situations, using Southern European 
Nations between 2007 and 2017 as case study. Our sample is based on 115 publicity listed and 
randomly selected Southern European companies from France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece, on all of which a set of regressions was be applied for analysis. Our results demonstrate 
that CSR performance is negatively and significantly related to Financial Distress. 
Complementary proxy measures for CSR performance and Financial Distress are tested in this 
analysis to add robustness to our results. In comparison to many preceding studies on the 
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subject, we have integrated corporate governance into our models, as the environmental, social 
and governance dimensions should be studied through a fully integrated framework (Galbreath, 
2013 and King, 2011). This paper has the following structure. Firstly, CSR context within 
Europe will be well-defined through an underlying concept based on ESG Scores. Secondly, 
the theoretical framework will be presented. Our third chapter will then present the data and 
methodology applied for the purposes of empirical analysis. Lastly, the outcomes from our 
analysis will be examined, on which the main conclusions of this research will be built, so as 
to provide further insight and additional perspectives not covered by the current literature. 
 
1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility in Europe  
 
European organizations have traditionally been more than ever conscious and attentive 
regarding CSR values, strategies and rules. It is evident however, that conceptualization and 
considerations on CSR vary among the different EU countries and regions (Mullerat, 2013). In 
order to proceed to the creation and incorporation of an international CSR framework, one must 
understand that there is no global agreed-upon optimum approach or method in addressing CSR 
concerns (Argandoña and Hoivik, 2009). Even within the EU, member states differences arises 
from culture, politics, economy or history. The United States had a crucial pioneering role in 
the development of business ideas where Corporate Social Responsibility had relevance in 
strategic and performance terms. Meanwhile, CSR has also become a fully assimilated concept 
in Europe as well. Nevertheless, in comparative terms, CSR in Europe differs considerably from 
CSR in the United States. The European Union is looking for a conceptual agenda and definition 
of social objectives through more regulated methods, in contrast to the United States where 
CSR policies are seen as far more voluntary actions and plans by individual firms. Hurst (2009) 
argues that European companies are in a stronger position than the United States in social terms, 
due to their efforts to combine CSR and business strategy.  
  
In order to set a path towards sustainable improvement, the European Commission placed great 
emphasis on defining and promoting the relevance of CSR in the Green Paper of 2001. CSR 
was made to be a strategic mechanism for building a more competitive and socially 
interconnected society, while also revolutionizing and reinforcing the European social model. 
Businesses and organizations were required to provide additional relevant information in a 
transparent manner and detailing the social and environmental impact of their enterprises. In 
addition, the Commission started to expect corporate commitments on ethical behavior, 
responsible practices and overall transparency. Despite a clear definition of strategies to follow 
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regarding CSR implementation within the European Union, the years since the publication of 
the green paper saw significant challenges and events preventing the progress of Europe’s CSR 
program. These challenges in turn, led to the EU becoming even more aware and dynamic in 
inspiring enterprises to use CSR activities for incentivizing sustainable development, 
innovation and competitiveness. This set of European social and environmentally responsible 
goals faced numerous challenges in terms of application at the member state level. The 
alteration and unstable mandates of political parties all over Europe, along with the global 
economic crisis of 2008 and its impact on the southern part of the continent, generated 
enormous and severe concerns. These were focused on the social and economic dimensions 
which made the understanding and growth of EU strategy on CSR uncertain and eventually 
even more problematic (Türker and Altuntas, 2012). Despite such tremendous difficulties, 
European countries responded well towards adversity, and have increasingly demonstrated their 
willingness to participate in projects intended to improve environmental and social 
responsibility. Furthermore, organizations have begun to divulge more sustainable and CSR-
focused reports than ever before, is clear evidence of the importance given not only by 
managers, but also by investors and other stakeholders, to these issues (Nielsen et al., 2013). 
 
Through the focus on particular EU member states, the United Kingdom can be distinguished 
for its developments of qualitative aspects of CSR. This can be explained as the result of a 
particular set of conditions, such as a consistent following of its core concepts, widespread 
cooperation between NGOs with environmental commitments and businesses, serving as the 
headquarters for numerous multinational corporations, and possessing strong regulations on the 
disclosure of sustainability reports (Mullerat, 2013). In Italy, the CSR movement is gaining 
strength through social and environmental activity and lobbying from SMEs in cooperation 
with the financial and banking sectors. France is also susceptible to achieve a stable 
enlargement in CSR matters, as the government is able to create regulations leading to stable 
labor relations while supporting SMEs through innovative CSR actions. Even with this positive 
short-term outlook when considering the growth of CSR investments in Europe, it is imperative 
to realize that the principal objective of shareholders remains the growth of their wealth. It is 
therefore crucial for companies and their shareholders to effectively manage the symbiosis 
between profit maximization and CSR integration. In order to materialize its 2020 strategy of 
“smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”, a well-organized execution of CSR procedures must 
be settled by the European Commission, and thereby helping it to create a more transparent and 
effective economy (Nielsen et al., 2013). 
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1.2 The ESG Framework Structure 
 
For the purposes of this study, the ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) Score and 
ESG Combined Score will be measured as a proxy of CSR Performance along with the three 
main pillars of the ESG score. They are thus considered as independent variables. Before 
proceeding into the methodological features of this approach however, it is essential to present 
the concept and theories behind the calculation of these scores. In order to quantify CSR 
performance, several methods are being tested. Although when assessing all our comparable 
data across different countries and companies, it becomes essential to secure an external and 
independent source to obtain reliable information. Taking this into consideration, every data 
concerning ESG scores and CSR information was extracted from a unique database, named 
Refinitiv’s Datastream ESG Scores. Refinitiv identifies the progressively critical importance of 
clear, precise and comparable social and environmental data for researchers and investors in 
the financial industry. These scores are designed to provide transparent insight into ESG risks, 
opportunities in investment portfolios, and benchmarks on peer companies, therefore providing 
additional information for the purposes of investment decision-making. Using 10 main factors, 
scores are firstly computed for the three different pillars of the ESG Framework (Environmental 
performance, Social performance and Governance performance) which allows us to distill the 
individual performance of each CSR dimension. Subsequently, the three pillars are assembled 
into the global ESG score which is calculated using the weighted average of our 10 factors. 
These are defined as: Resources Use, Emissions, Innovation, Management, Shareholders, CSR 
Strategy, Workforce, Human Rights, Community, and Product Responsibility. The score 
attribution for these 10 factors is based on over 400 ESG metrics which are retrieved and 
calculated from a variety of trustworthy sources such as companies’ annual reports, company 
websites, CSR reports, and NGO websites. With the intention of presenting an accurate 
reflection of companies’ CSR effectiveness and performance, this database provides results 
through both simple to understand percentages (0%-100%), and letter grades from D- to A+. In 
table 1, the percentages used to compute the scores of the three main dimensions along with 
ESG scores are presented. Figure 1 further provides us with the entirety of the organizational 
framework used in the computation of the ESG Scores. 
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The ESG Combined Score can be considered to be an extension of the normal ESG Score as it 
takes into consideration the ESG Controversies score, which is itself based on damaging media 
stories and corporate image. This score is based on 23 ESG controversy metrics, with company 
involvement in controversies or scandals greatly increasing its influence, therefore potentially 
and significantly reducing the overall ESG Combined Score. On the other hand, when there are 
no corporate scandals or polemic news to speak of, the ESG Controversies score equals to zero, 
thus resulting in an ESG Combined Score that is equal to the ESG Score. One can observe three 
distinct scenarios through the application of our methodology. Initially, if the Controversies 
Score is equal to or greater than 50, then our ESG Score equals the ESG Combined Score. If 
the Controversies Score is greater than the ESG Score, but is still below 50, then the ESG 
Combined Score will simply equal the ESG Score. Finally, if the Controversies Score is below 
50 and also inferior to the ESG Score, then the ESG Combined Score will equal the average of 






























Table 1 - Weights allocated to each CSR Factor. Source: 
Refinitiv, 2019 
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
 
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) was introduced a long time ago, and it 
has been a topic of debate since the 1950s, when Howard R. Bowen suggested that businesses 
had the responsibility of attaining goals of social fairness and economic prosperity by 
generating welfare for an extensive range of societal stakeholders (Bowen, 1953). Despite this 
first standard of expressive appreciation, other researchers have shown skepticism towards the 
idea that CSR is a fundamental business process. They argue instead that its activities and 
strategies can be analyzed as risk management procedures, used by firms to attain greater levels 
of reputation and thus gain protection against social, political and regulatory punitive sanctions 
(Godfrey, 2005; Minor and Morgan, 2011). 
 
In Freeman’s book “Strategic Management: A Stakeholder approach” published in 1984, the 
Stakeholder Theory was proposed as an alternative to the standard model of financial 
economics which defends the maximization of shareholder wealth as the ultimate objective of 
a company’s management board. In opposition, Freeman proposes that the goal of a company 
should not be to merely focus on the shareholder, it should instead assure synchronized utility 
maximization of all groups and individuals, including employees, community and costumers, 
which affect and are affected by the pursuit of the company goals. Many academics have tried 
to defend and endorse the Stakeholder Theory, but resistance to this model continues to persist, 
as it is unclear how to maximize the utility of stakeholders through engagement in activities 
that equally benefit both shareholders and stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). Although Stakeholder 
Theory differs from the concept of CSR (Hillmand & Keim, 2001), these two notions agree 
with the argument that stakeholder management became an essential dimension of business 
strategy (Freeman, 1984), thereby fostering the implementation of CSR activities in order to 
satisfy the interests of most of those involved in the corporation’s environment. 
 
To fully meet their Corporate Social Responsibility, businesses should strive to streamline 
processes for the incorporation of social, environmental, and ethical, human rights and 
consumer concerns into their business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with 
stakeholders. The maximization of shared value for shareholders, stakeholders and society at 
large is the primary objective of CSR. (EU Commission, 2011). 
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In 1991, and prior to this characterization, Archie B. Carrol designed a Corporate Social 
Responsibility pyramid, illustrated in figure 2 below, which represents the four distinct 
“responsibilities” of a corporation. Starting from the base, we have Economic concern, a 
fundamental necessity for an enterprise to survive and benefit society in the long-term. Legal 
responsibility represents a duty to obey laws, directives and official public policy. The ability 
to act morally, ethically and go beyond the narrow requirements of the law, is symbolized by 
an Ethical responsibility further up on the pyramid. Lastly, Philanthropic responsibility 











   
 




Corporate Social Responsibility can be broadly expressed as voluntary firm activities designed 
to develop social or environmental conditions (Mackey et al. 2007). The strict definition of this 
concept is unclear and there are several different variations proposed. CSR theory subsequently 
fluctuates significantly between different companies and organizations in terms of 
interpretation and implementation (Lau et al., 2007). Nevertheless, there is consensus in the 
idea that CSR is considered to be a fundamental factor in the success and survival of a firm 
(Hoi et al., 2013). In addition, the combined benefits from positive engagement in CSR-related 
activities may generate an optimistic financial outlook and supplementary gains, and thus 












Figure 2 - CSR Pyramid by Archie B. Carroll 
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2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance 
 
Under the assumption that financial performance and Financial Distress are two closely linked 
concepts (Opler and Titman, 1994), it is imperative to review the literature on both CSR and 
Financial Performance, before analyzing the impact of CSR activities on a company’s 
probability of entering into a Financial Distress situation. As previously stated, the 
conceptualization of CSR has become a relevant topic of interest over time, and this interest 
has flourished even further when the relationship between CSR and Financial Performance is 
tested and analyzed. Corporate Social Responsibility is no longer seen as a hypothetical 
competitive advantage for a firm, but rather as a real strategic prerequisite (Falkenberg and 
Brunsael, 2011). Consequently, companies and their shareholders have begun to realize the 
importance and the need to allocate funds and investment into CSR campaigns in order to 
promote a positive environmental and social impact (Maretno H. et al. 2016).  
 
 Although several studies have covered the topic, evidence from evaluations of CSR impact on 
firms’ financial performance has been mixed.  There is a noticeable variety and range of 
opinions within the literature, Margolis and Walsh (2001) for instance, find little evidence of 
an association between corporate social performance and financial performance. Some 
researchers however, claim to have found strong links between CSR and: financial performance 
(Orlizky et al. 2003; Waddock and Graves 1997; Eccles et al. 2013), positive effects on the 
image and reputation of a company (Schwaiger, 2007), employee motivation and retention 
(European Commission, 2001), increased competitiveness thorough process and product 
benefits (Porter and Van der Linde, 1998) or through costs savings (Epstein and Roy, 2001). 
Other scholars within the literature have focused on a financial perspective, analyzing returns 
to investors who choose portfolios of firms with high levels of CSR. Once again, the results are 
mixed and there is little consensus surrounding this topic (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). There 
are some indications of a growing consensus however that while there is clear benefit in impact 
investment, there is also little if any negative consequence associated with it (Statman et al, 
2006). Some researchers have found a positive connection (Posnikoff, 1997), others purport to 
have discovered a negative relationship (Wright and Ferris, 1997; Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2001; 
Barnea et al,. 2010), and yet others find no relationship at all (Teoh et al., 1999; Hillman and 
Keim, 2001).   
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One reasonable explanation for the discrepancy in results within the literature is the time frame 
inherent to CSR activities. The costs of CSR are immediate, whilst many of its benefits and 
effects are not. Consequently, investors with different maturity preferences value firms’ CSR 
performance differently (Tsoutsoura, 2004). Baron (2006) suggests that the intensification of 
competitively motivated companies seeking to invest in social actions set them apart from other 
organizations, in particular due to the reaction of other companies in maintaining or decreasing 
their investments into a particular social responsibility action. After reviewing the literature, it 
can be stated that there is some agreement that involvement in Corporate Social Responsibility 
can be used as a means of differentiation in a competitive market (Jonhson, 1966; Fisman et 
al., 2005; Baron, 2006; Fernández-Kranz and Santaló, 2010). 
 
2.3 Dimensions of Corporate Social Responsibility  
Another pertinent field of study relates to the three different dimensions of CSR: environmental, 
social and governance. The environmental dimension of CSR is an extremely well-researched 
field of study. The connection between performance in this environmental dimension and 
overall financial performance, however, remains uncertain. Companies which implement 
environmentally responsible practices are more likely to generate positive stakeholder 
perception (Turcotte et al. 2007), which in turn results in improved economic performance. 
While some studies have reported a positive relationship between these two variables (Schnietz 
and Epstein 2005), others have found a negative relationship (Wagner et al. 2002; Gray et al., 
1993), seemingly due to the high costs associated with the implementation of environmental 
strategies, along with interrelated productivity inefficiencies.  
As regards to the social aspect, it is possible for one to argue that there is more consensus within 
the academic and research society on the effects of this particular dimension than on those of 
the environmental dimension. The development and implementation of several social activities 
in the corporate environment, such as employee rights, voluntary support or professional 
training, are seen as an essential business process and strategy by stakeholders (Rhouma et al., 
2012). Moreover, managers recognize that using social activities generates goodwill, which in 
turn may increase a firm’s value (Jensen 2002; Brown et al., 2006). 
Company’s actions in the dimension of governance can also influence stakeholders’ opinions 
and perception towards a company, which may generate relevant and positive returns for the 
firm (Gill, 2008).  According to Cespa and Cestone (2007), investments made in CSR from 
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CEOs intensifies stakeholder empathy, reinforces their positions inside the company, and 
improves economic results. 
 
2.4 Financial Distress  
 
Starting with Altman’s (1968) study on the fundamental causes of bankruptcy, corporate 
Financial Distress, and defaults marked a watershed moment on a topic under consistent 
investigation and analysis for the past 50 years. Following on the footsteps of this initial study, 
the Z-score formula emerged, thereafter becoming widely used as a measure of Financial 
Distress, becoming generally accepted due to its simplicity and consistency. The Altman Z-
score is the output of a credit-strength examination which measures a publicly traded 
manufacturing company's likelihood of bankruptcy (Altman el al, 2014).  Corporate Financial 
Distress is a general term with various and distinct but widely used definitions among the 
research society. These can include insolvency, failure, bankruptcy and default (Altman and 
Hotchkiss, 2006). Taking these factors into account, several designations of Financial Distress 
were defined. Platt and Platt (2002) describe Financial Distress as a late phase of corporate 
deterioration which precedes a more damaging result, like bankruptcy. According to Zmijewski 
(1984), financially distressed companies are simply those which “fill a petition for bankruptcy”. 
Mackee (2003) on the other hand, advocates that several events can happen before going into 
bankruptcy, with poor income and unsatisfactory liquid asset positions being some events 
which categorize a firm in a situation of Financial Distress.  
  
Furthermore, Financial Distress increases incentives for risk-shifting practices (Maksimovic 
and Titman; Eberhart and Senbet, 1993), a concept introduced by Galai and Masulis (1976) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). This concept is characterized by incentives from shareholders and 
managers to invest in negative NPV projects, which may themselves generate benefits if certain 
goals and objectives are met, while bondholders must bear the costs if the endeavor goes poorly 
(Eisdorfer, 2008). Financially distressed firms demonstrate a variety of conditions which 
evidence an underprivileged situation, these being: growth in the cost of capital, weaker credit 
ratings, a reduction in access to external funding sources, and in most circumstances an increase 




The wider body of literature on the subject contains an enormity of proposed theories and 
methods on how to measure the likelihood and probability of a firm entering into Financial 
Distress. Accounting-based variables in statistical models were the first ones proposed and 
tested by Altman (1968, 1984), but these have come under fire by several other scholars. They 
argue instead that such simulations provide unreliable estimations since an investigator can only 
accurately analyze a firm’s variables at the time of default (Shumway, 2001). Shumway (2001) 
recommends instead, the adoption of a hazard model to gather information, in contrast to the 
linear discriminant technique suggested by Altman. Merton (1974) on the other hand, 
demonstrates that a system of nonlinear equations can define the probability of defaults based 
on stock prices, by relying on a simple set of assumptions. Yet another practical approach to 
evaluating financial soundness was proposed by Zmijewski (1984). This approach is also based 
in accounting variables, unlike Shumway (2001)’s or Merton (1974)’s models which rely on 
market variables. A more exhaustive overview regarding credit risk models can be further 
analyzed in Allen et al. (2004).  
 
2.5 Financial Distress and Corporate Social Responsibility Performance 
 
Studies into the effects of CSR activities on Financial Distress generally correspond to a 
negative correlation between both topics. Within intensely CSR-focused firms, improved 
financial performance is further improved through the creation of solid relationships with key 
stakeholders such as creditors, suppliers, customers and employees, which lends itself to an 
improved probability of future growth (Godfrey et al. 2009 and Attig et al. 2013). Stable CSR 
engagement is itself correlated with an inferior cost of equity, consequently firms that 
demonstrate high intensities of CSR practices express considerably lower idiosyncratic risk (El 
Ghoul et al. 2011). Waddock and Graves (1997) find that enterprises which use financial 
resources strategically and efficiently in order to reach stakeholders’ expectations may have 
their corporate reputation and competitiveness reinforced. According to Cheng et al. (2013), a 
focus on a solid CSR approach generates enhanced stakeholder engagement and transparency 
within and around the firm, helping to moderate any limitations to funding.  
 
As previously stated, CSR can be analyzed as a risk management approach (Godfrey, 2005). 
This argument describes CSR practices as a means of attending to the interests of both 
shareholders and stakeholders, allowing for the mitigation of the risk of falling into a situation 
of Financial Distress (Minor and Morgan, 2011 and Hoi et al. 2013). Godfrey et al. (2009) 
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claim that when firms concentrate on society as a whole through the use of CSR activities, risk 
management evaluation is strengthened, which in turn generates goodwill and eases access to 
external capital, providing financial protection and stability against any possible future negative 
challenges and events. Management ineffectiveness and incompetence is one of the principal 
reasons behind a business sliding into a financially problematic condition (Altman and 
Hotchkiss, 2006).  
 
In most cases CSR practices may be seen as a proxy of governance quality, and consequently 
firms involved in such practices are less likely to fall into a status of Financial Distress (Attig 
and Cleary, 2015). Overall, promising governance practices and constructive employee 
relationships are key mechanisms which can lead to positive returns (Edmans 2008; Bertrand 
et al. 2003). The success of individual businesses depends on their capacity to reflect all types 
of stakeholders’ affairs (Donaldson and Preston 1995), with their insights acting as a connection 
between the CSR performance of businesses, and their economic and financial performances 
(Barnett 2007). Regarding the existing literature, it is important to mention that when financial 
performance and CSR performance are studied and analyzed, results appear to diverge as the 
research typically focuses on different countries, industries or markets. Furthermore, when one 
considers that financial performance is strongly correlated with Financial Distress, reviewing 
and understanding the wider body of literature on the subject becomes an essential requirement.  
In what the relationship between CSR performance and Financial Distress however, it appears 
clear that opinions and conclusions are typically less controversial within the research 
community. There is a consensus on the meaning and significance of the link, although most 
research typically focuses on individual correlation between specific dimensions of CSR 
(environmental, social and governance), while the body of research focusing specifically on 
Financial Distress is neither as extensive nor as conclusive. Following on the footsteps of 
previous studies and their results, we expect our results to concur with previous suggestions of 
the existence of a plausible negative association between a firm’s positive CSR performance 
and their likelihoods of entering into Financial Distress (Al-Hadi et al, 2017). In simple terms, 
we anticipate firms which demonstrate a higher strategic focus on CSR activities to be subjected 
to lower levels of Financial Distress. As such, the first hypothesis within our project is 
formulated as follows:  
 
H1: Firms with higher levels of positive CSR performance are less likely to fall into situations 
of Financial Distress. 
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To summarize, stakeholder theory describes stakeholders as parties that impact or are impacted 
by the activities of an organization (Freeman, 1984), with business success thus relying on their 
ability to consider all manners and kinds of stakeholders’ interests (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). Taking this into account, subjects regarding environmental, governance and social topics 
are typically relevant for stakeholders, and as such they need the additional consideration of the 
next three research hypotheses presented below. Based on the existing literature, we propose 
that the three distinct dimensions of Corporate Social Responsibility are negatively associated 
with Financial Distress. This effectively means that firms which engage in environmental, 
social and responsible governance activities and procedures face lower levels of Financial 
Distress. Thus: 
H2: Firms with higher levels of positive Environmental performance are less likely to fall into 
situations of Financial Distress, 
H3: Firms with higher levels of positive Social performance are less likely to fall into situations 
of Financial Distress. 
H4: Firms with higher levels of positive Corporate Governance performance are less likely to 
fall into situations of Financial Distress. 
3. Data & Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample and Data 
 
This research is based on a sample of 115 randomly selected and publicity-listed Southern 
European firms during the 2007-2017 timeframe. After the exclusion of companies with 
missing data, and companies operating in the financial industry, our final sample contains 1265 
firm-year observations from the following 5 Southern European countries: France, Portugal, 
Spain, Italy and Greece. All data concerning financial information, CSR performance and other 
relevant company material is retrieved from Refinitiv Datastream. This database is one of the 
largest and most up to date ESG information collections in the world, and of particular relevance 
and utility to our research goals. Calculation of scores’ is based on more than 400 ESG metrics 







As previously stated, all variables, including dependent, independent and control variables, are 
calculated from the database data provided by Refinitiv Datastream. This database provides 
economic and financial time series data for 175 countries and 60 markets and is widely used in 
various research projects in this field, being generally considered within the literature as a 
reliable, trustworthy and valuable source. DataStream offers data from numerous organizations, 
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and various other national government sources. Specific measurements 
and descriptions regarding every variable used in this dissertation is provided in Table 2. 
 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Following the former approach employed by Al-Hadi (2017) and other studies focused on 
topics related to Financial Distress (Altman, 1968; Berger et al, 1999; Almeida and Campello, 
2017), three different measures of Financial Distress are employed in this dissertation: Altman 
(1968)’s model (AltmanZ), Berger et al. (1999)’s model (BOS_DIS) and Almeida and 
Campello (2007)’s model (AC_DIS). These last two assess a firms’ asset tangibility. This 
approach provides a more realistic perspective, as relying on more measures allows us to 
account for further theoretical perspectives and ideas, thereby improving the robustness of our 
results. It is also pertinent to mention that greater values within these Financial Distress proxies 
mean lower levels of Financial Distress. This applies to all of the methods we have just listed 
above. 
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Regarding independent variables, our study employs ESG scores as proxies for CSR 
performance. A firm’s total ESG scores, ESG combined scores and the scores of the three main 
ESG dimensions are evaluated. Moreover, every score is graded from 0 to 100, with 100 being 
the maximum score a company could conceivably reach.  ESG performance scores from 
Refinitiv database are increasingly used as a measure of CSR performance (Cuesta and Valor, 
2013) due to their relevance as a source of information for investors choosing where to allocate 
their capital to (Richardson, 2009). According to O’Dwyer et al. (2005), several stakeholders 
are progressively requesting more and more CSR information and to rely on for investment 
decision-making processes. Given this trend, we found it reasonable, relevant and useful to use 
this data for our research purposes. Furthermore, each dimension of the ESG score is used 
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separately to assess the impact of environmental, social and corporate governance practices. 
These are defined as the ENV Score, the SOC score and the GOV score, respectively. As 
previously stated, the quantified total ESG score is a weighted average of the scores of each 
separate dimension of the ESG score. Table 1 can be referred to for the specific weights’ 
distribution among CSR factors. Finally, the ESG Combined score (ESGC Score) is used to 
interpret the impact of controversial events or scandals that a company may be subjected to or 
engaged in.  
3.2.2 Control Variables 
Due to the considerable number of different factors that may influence a firm’s likelihood of 
entering into a situation of Financial Distress, several conventional control variables are applied 
in order to remove confounding effects from our results. Building upon past research, it is clear 
that the majority of researchers in this field of study have incorporated a number of the same 
control variables (Waddock and Graves, 1997, Hillman and Keim, 2001; Al-Hadi et al, 2017). 
The control variables we have elected to rely upon for our work here are firm size, leverage, 
research and development (R&D) intensity, cash holding, liquidity, profitability, industry 
sector, country, and year effects. Further to this, the particular definition of each control variable 
is provided below. 
Firm size (Size): This variable is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of total 
assets of the firm. This is a variable of particular interest, as it controls for differences in 
resources, ability to handle competition, and overall financing prospects. Based on the existing 
literature, it is expected that larger firms are typically more capable of engaging in CSR 
practices and to better handle periods of Financial Distress due to their higher economic and 
political influence when compared to smaller firms.  
 
Leverage (Leverage): the ratio of the total debt (long-term plus short-term debt) against the 
book value of the firm’s total assets. This variable is used as heavily indebted companies may 
possess fewer of the opportunities and funds necessary to engage in CSR strategies.  
 
Cash (Cash): the ratio of total cash to the book value of the firm’s total assets. This variable 
demonstrates how much capital and capital-derived resources a firm possesses which can be 
utilized during phases of financial restrictions.  
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Return on Assets (ROA): employed to control for a company’s overall profitability as 
companies with healthier levels of financial performance are less likely to face situations of 
default.  
 
Liquidity (Liquidity Ratio): measured as the ratio of the sum of Cash & Receivables and 
Current Liabilities, this variable controls for a firm’s ability to meet its financial obligations, 
along with its capacity to supply funds for the company´s regular operations.  
 
R&D intensity (R&D): calculated as R&D expenditure divided by a firm’s total assets, this 
variable controls for levels of R&D spending. It is of particular importance to incorporate this 
variable, as a firms' risk of entering into Financial Distress increases with the intensity of their 
engagement in R&D. (Wei Zhang, 2015).  
Furthermore, we control for plausible Financial Distress variation across different industry 
segments, through industry sector (IND) dummy variables, defined as the first two characters 
of The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Lastly, dummies for Year (Year) and Country 
(Country) variables are also implemented to control for any fluctuations that may happen due 
to time and space-specific contexts and circumstances, rather than the impact of independent or 
other control variables.   
3.3 Methodology 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore and understand the link between Financial Distress and CSR 
Performance over time through a panel data method. This research includes cross-sectional data 
with continuous variables, while employing an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method for all 
regression analyses as a baseline model. For our purposes, the programming software for the 
effective analysis of our dataset will be Stata.  
 
For the purposes of this paper and to acquire a more complete understanding regarding the 
relationship between Financial Distress and CSR, a three-step methodology approach is will be 
applied. A set of three regressions is developed and relied upon, requiring the evaluation of 
different hypotheses and results. Our first regression will estimate solely the effect of a 
company’s Total ESG Score (ESG Score) on the three distinct dependent variables, these being 
the Altman Z Score (AltmanZ), Almeida and Campello (AC_DIS)’s  Financial Distress model, 
and Berger et al.’s model (BOS_DIS). Moreover, the group of control variables we have 
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defined above is throughout all of the regressions that follow. As such and building upon these 
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This first combination of regressions will establish the type of association CSR possesses with 
Financial Distress. The subsequent results may reveal distinct kinds of relationships, our 
research expects however to find a positive relationship between the Financial Distress metrics 
and ESG score, in line with Hypothesis 1. It is important to remember that greater values within 
these Financial Distress variables imply inferior levels of Financial Distress. 
 
Our second set of regressions will use the ESG Combined Score (ESGC Score) variable rather 
than the ESG Score in order to analyze once more the relationship between Financial Distress 
and CSR. In this case, the difference is related to the fact this variable aggregates the effects of 
controversies and scandals which a company may be involved with. A company which is well-
known to suffer from a poor reputation in the eyes of the media or other sources of public 
information, may feel the consequences in its overall ESG Combined Score, given that it is 
derived from the ESG Score and ESG Controversies Score. In summary, the central objective 
of this score is to discount the ESG score based on damaging media stories. From the outcomes 
of these three regressions, conclusions can be drawn regarding the magnitude of the influence 
of the Controversies Score and its effects on the general model. We expect however, to find a 
negative relationship between the ESG Combined Score and Financial Distress, and thus in 
agreement with Hypothesis 1. Such a result would suggest that the impact of controversies is 
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Last but not least, the final set of regressions will use all three distinct dimensions of ESG (our 
ENV, SOC, and GOV scores) as explanatory variables, to explain our dependent variables 
AltmanZ, BOS_DIS and AC_DIS. This will provide us with insight into their individual 
contribution and effect on a firms’ levels of Financial Distress. The regression necessary for 
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These regressions and their results can demonstrate the types of specific practices that are most 
advantageous for companies to engage in, in order to avoid financial pressure. In this phase, 
results may diverge as there is a great deal of uncertainty within the literature regarding the 
individual effects of our three dimensions on levels of Financial Distress. Despite the challenge 
this poses in identifying a pattern in terms of our individual dimensions’ results, these 




A traditional threat to the accurate regression analysis is heteroskedasticity, emerging when the 
size of an error term differs across the values of an independent variable. This issue does not 
necessarily mean that coefficient estimates are biased or inconsistent, but rather that their 
variance could be affected, thereby making subsequent OLS standard errors untrustworthy 
(Wooldridge, 2012). To correct for this issue, a robust standard errors technique is employed in 
all regressions of this study. 
 
3.4 Summary Statistics   
 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for all variables included in our regressions. Our summary 
statistics condense the data gathered from a total of 115 companies, all of which originate from 
5 Southern European countries, during a timeframe of 11 years, from 2007 to 2017. As regards 
our dependent variables, our Altman Z score (AltmanZ), along with Almeida and Campello’s 
(AC_DIS) and Berger et al.’s (BOS_DIS) models of Financial Distress, it becomes evident that 
the average firm included in the sample possesses an Altman Z score of 1.151. When applying 
our BOS_DIS and AC_DIS models, we obtain values of 0.311 and 0.377 respectively. In terms 
of our independent variables, the ESG Score, ESG Combined Score, and the individual scores 
for performance in our environmental, social and governance dimensions, we obtain an average 
(median) of 62.94 (65.87), 54.40 (53.12), 69.66 (74.16), 67.99 (71.93) and 50.01 (50.77), 
respectively. Finally, in terms of our control variables, the businesses in our sample have an 
average (median) logarithm Book Value of Assets (Size) of 16.04 (16.09), an R&D Intensity of 
0.0116 (0.0), an ROA of 4.682 (4.340), a Cash ratio of 0.665 (0.123), a ratio Debt on Total 
Assets (Leverage) of 0.321 (0.29), and a Liquidity Ratio of 0.947 (0.86). A tolerable range in 
variation was obtained for all our variables, along with an acceptable level of steadiness among 
our means and medians, indicating a normality of distributions across the board.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of scores obtained throughout the time frame of our analysis. 
There is a noticeable upward trend in the Environmental Score and Social Score, while the 
Governance Score remains constant throughout all 11 years. This constancy may slow the 
growth of the ESG Score, as it is a weighted average of all the three dimensions. Through the 
evolution of the ESG Combined Score, it appears that the Controversies Score may possess a 
significant impact in this overall score, with the trends we obtained presenting lower and 
steadier results when compared to the evolution of the overall ESG Score. 
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            Figure 3 - This figure presents the ESG Scores’ average evolution between 2007 and 2017 for the whole sample. 
  
 
In order to provide a more realistic and detailed analysis, our sample was divided by country. 
The following graph illustrates the scores’ evolution by each of the five countries included 
within our work. Starting with Figure 4, there is a clear upward trend in the ESG Score for the 
majority of our countries. In France, Greece and Spain, a greater level of awareness regarding 
the themes of Corporate Social Responsibility is apparent, with our scores evidencing a steady 
growth over our timeframe. In 2010, Portugal presented the highest values in terms of CSR 
performance when compared with the other countries in our sample, although the scores’ 
evolution also demonstrated high levels of unpredictability due to economic and political 
instability, Finally, we observed lower levels of CSR performance for Italy when compared 
with our other countries, although it also recorded the most stable levels within our sample, 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
Before proceeding to the results of our OLS regressions, it is important to check the correlation 
matrix for multicollinearity among the variables included in each of our regressions. The 
absence of this econometric issue in our analyses was confirmed throughout our work and is 
available for perusing in Table 4. None of the independent variables employed in the same 
regression models has correlation coefficients greater than an accepted standard value. 
 
4.1 OLS Method 
 
Table 5 reports regression outputs for the relationship between Financial Distress and CSR 
performance over the 2007-2017 period. In our first (1) regression, the measure of CSR 
performance matches the ESG Score, with greater values of Financial Distress proxies meaning 
inferior levels of distress for all our regression analyses. For the majority of our regressions, we 
were able to detect a positive and statistically significant (p<0.01) relationship between ESG 
Score and levels of Financial Distress, which suggests the existence of a negative relationship 
with Financial Distress. These results coincide with the existing literature, which supports that 
high levels of CSR performance lead to lower levels of Financial Distress, further confirming 
our H1. Our second (2) regression also provided interesting results, the introduction of a dummy 
variable for industry resulted in all control variables providing us with results below the ESG 
Score in a statistically significant manner. Our fourth (4) regression was the only to provide us 
with statistically significant p-values higher than 1%, corresponding to over 5%. In general, 
these results suggest that firms engaged in more intensive CSR strategies will tend to decrease 
their likelihood of facing situations of Financial Distress.  
 
Regarding our control variables, it is clear that in analyses where they present statistically 
significant values, they present expected effects. Specifically, our Leverage returns negative 
statistically significant (p < 0.01) regression coefficients for AltmanZ, suggesting that 
companies with higher levels of indebtedness have increased likelihood of becoming financially 
constrained. The regression coefficient for Size is positive for AltmanZ in a statistically 
significant manner (p < 0.05), thus supporting the idea that larger firms are able to wield higher 
financial and political influence than smaller firms, in turn suggesting that they are less likely 
to experience Financial Distress. Moreover, R&D returns negative statistically significant (p < 
0.01) regression coefficients for AltmanZ, meaning that firms with higher levels of R&D 
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investment are more likely to increase their likelihood of entering into situations of Financial 
Distress. There is a surprisingly result for that variable however, as it shows a positive 
relationship with AC_DIS. ROA and Cash in turn, demonstrate statistically significant (p < 
0.05 or better) positive coefficients for the majority of our regressions. The regression 
coefficient for Liquidity Ratio is positive for both AltmanZ and AC_DIS at a statistically 
significant (p < 0.05 or better) level, while seemingly indicates a negative relationship with 
BOS_DIS. 
 
Table 6 shows our regressions’ results regarding the impact of the ESG Combined Score 
explanatory variable, estimated against levels of Financial Distress, these are once more 
checked along our AltmanZ, BOS_DIS and AC_DIS models. The subsequent results are 
similar comparing to our first set of regressions. For equations (1), and (3) to (6), the ESG 
Combined Score (ESGC Score) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Equation 
(2) is the only that returns statistically significant values at the 10% level instead. These results 
support the idea that firms with higher levels of positive CSR performance are less likely to 
find themselves in situations of Financial Distress, thereby concurring with H1. Furthermore, 
these results imply that the weight given to controversies and corporate scandals is not strong 
enough to decrease the total ESG Score. There is also a possibility that the companies in this 
sample simply did not engage in disgraceful practices and activities at significantly high levels.  
 
During the evaluation of our control variables it becomes clear that Size is positively associated 
with our measures of Financial Distress and statistically significant (p < 0.10 or better) for 
equations (2), (3) and (5). R&D is consistent in returning statistically significant (p < 0.01) 
negative regression coefficients for AltmanZ, while hinting at a positive relationship with 
AC_DIS. ROA exhibits statistically significant (p < 0.01) positive regression coefficients for 
all equations, with the exception of equation (3) which does not return statistically significant 
values. The same happens for Cash in equation (4), with this variable adding no statistical 
significance to the model, despite its statistical significance for our other equations (p<0.05 or 
better). As for our first group of regressions, Leverage is negative for AltmanZ at a statistically 
significant level (p < 0.01). Finally, the results for Liquidity Ratio further confirm the results 
we obtained from our first group of regressions (Table 5). 
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Lastly, Table 7 reports the outputs on the third set of regressions.  Throughout this phase of our 
research, results proved to be too inconsistent and not statistically significant enough for 
valuable conclusions.  
 
Beginning with our analysis of the Environmental Score (ENV Score), it presented statistically 
significant (p < 0.01) positive regression coefficients for AltmanZ, supporting our H2, but it 
did not manage to gain additional statistical significance when considering the BOS_DIS and 
AC_DIS models. The Social Score (SOC Score) analyses however, provided us with the most 
unexpected results in our regression analysis, returning a statistically significant and positive 
value for equations (3) to (6), and negative and statistically significant (p < 0.01) values for 
AltmanZ. The variable Governance Score (GOV Score) in turn, exhibited statistically 
significant (p < 0.01) positive regression coefficients for all equations, with the exception of 
equation (6) which is not statistically significant. These results concur with H4. In terms of the 
overall control variables, Size was positively associated at a statistically significant level (p < 
0.05) only for equation (2), while R&D returned statistically significant (p < 0.01) negative 
regression coefficients for AltmanZ, despite showing a positive relationship with AC_DIS. 
Leverage was shown to be statistically significant only when tested for AltmanZ, while ROA 
demonstrated statistically significant (p < 0.05 or better) positive regression coefficients for all 
equations except for (3), but not at a statistically significant level in that particular case. Cash 
returned positive and statistically significant results for all equations except (4). Finally, the 
regression coefficient for Liquidity Ratio was positive for AltmanZ and AC_DIS at a 
statistically significant level (p < 0.01 or better), despite showing a negative relationship with 
BOS_DIS. 
 
Regarding the interpretation of our results, there is a clear positive association between the 
individual Environmental Score and the AltmanZ score. This particular result agrees with the 
theory that focusing on environmentally responsible practices creates positive stakeholder 
perception, which in turn positively influences a firm’s economic performance (Schnietz and 
Epstein, 2005; Gray and Shadbegian, 1993), therefore reducing the likelihood of Financial 
Distress.  In the case of the Social Score, there is less clarity as to the consequences of our 
results, with clear positive links within our BOS_DIS and AC_DIS models, but a negative 
association with AltmanZ. This uncertainty may occur due to the nature of our dependent 
variables. Although these three measures serve as proxies for Financial Distress, the theories 
and content behind their creation differ greatly. AltmanZ corresponds to an accounting method 
 32 
relying on several financial ratios, while BOS_DIS and AC_DIS can be characterized as 
methods for the evaluation of asset tangibility. These two methods incorporate values for 
receivables, cash or inventory, meaning that they are more focused on operational effectiveness 
rather than financial performance. Therefore, our Social Score results could imply that 
companies who fulfill their social responsibilities will gain in operational terms, as it leads to a 
direct increase in receivables, cash or even inventory, despite not being efficient and reducing 
overall financial profitability. Finally, our Governance Score returned positive relationships in 
all measures, suggesting that a company’s positive engagement in governance activities 
consistently and positively impacts stakeholder engagement. These outcomes support the 
theory provided by Gill (2009), which purports that respectful Corporate Governance practices 
can be used as techniques for the generation of additional returns, therefore reducing a firm’s 
likelihood of entering into situations of Financial Distress. 
 
4.2 Robustness  
 
In this section, we re-run our regressions to study an important CSR phase in Europe. In 2011, 
the European Commission (EC) published its renewed EU 2011-2014 strategy for CSR, 
centered on the objective of helping organizations attain their full potential in terms of CSR, 
while contributing to several continent-wide challenges of the time. The European emphasis on 
CSR however, did not begin with this approach. In reality, the 2011 CSR strategy was the third 
Commission policy on the topic, following a green paper in 2001, and CSR Policy paper in 
2002 and 2006, suggesting an European increase in self-awareness in the field.  Based on 
generally accepted international CSR principles, the European Commission built its renewed 
strategy through the definition and implementation of different key goals. The EC sought to 
foster consensus and awareness concerning the importance of CSR, to further incorporate the 
concept into education, research and development. This would thus improve companies’ release 
of social and environmental information while elucidating on market rewards for CSR 
practices. Taking this into consideration, it is relevant to analyze results following the strategy’s 
implementation, and if the EU’s CSR policies are indeed reflected in the way that businesses 
act.  
 
With this notion, it is interesting to check whether the strategy had a real influence in 
companies’ levels of CSR engagement. In order to do so, all regressions employed so far will 
be estimated with a new group of explanatory variables. To understand the influence of CSR 
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policies, a dummy variable for the period after the implementation of the strategy (ASTRT) was 
incorporated, being attributed a value 1 for the years following 2011. The results for our first 
set of regressions using this new independent variable, are displayed in table 8. Upon analyzing 
the results, it becomes clear that the ASTRT*ESG variable is not statistically significant for 
regressions estimating under the BOS_DIS and AC_DIS models, suggesting that these new 
policies did not meet the European Commission’s expectations. On the other hand, for 
regressions estimating AltmanZ, our results turn out to be quite interesting, as the variable 
ASTRT*ESG reveals a positive relationship at a statistically significant level (p < 0.01) while 
our ESG variable loses its own significance. This suggests that policies implemented by the EC 
in 2011 were so effective that CSR began to have a relevant constructive role in corporate 
strategy. In Table 9, the same methodology was applied to a Combined Score (ESGC Score) 
variable. In this particular case, the ASTRT*ESGC variable was not significant for regressions 
estimated under the BOS_DIS and AC_DIS models. It did however return statistically 
significant and positive results for AltmanZ. These results appeared to coincide with those 
presented under our previous table. 
 
Finally, in Table 10, results concerning all three pillars are presented. Starting with our 
ASTRT*ENV variable, we observed statistically significant (p < 0.1 or better), results for both 
AltmanZ regressions. This particular result could mean that something changed after 2011 
regarding corporate environmental practices, as the Environmental Score variable lost its 
significance upon the introduction of our new variable. In the case of ASTRT*SOC, no 
significant outputs were detected, suggesting that no significant changes occurred after 2011, 
and therefore that the EU’s policies were not effective regarding this ESG dimension. In 
contrast to this observation, the testing of our Governance Score returned far less clear and 
consistent results. The ASTRT*GOV variable is statistically significant and positive for both 
the AltmanZ equations and for the AC_DIS model with Industry dummy (p < 0.05) variables, 
while the Governance Score remained statistically significant in equation (3) for the BOS_DIS 
model. 
 
In general, these results suggest that renewed European CSR policies achieved some success, 
evidenced by their effect on our AltmanZ dependent variable. This could mean that such 
strategies really brought increased CSR levels into companies’ activities and procedures, 
therefore translating into a successful policy for the European Commission. Nevertheless, it 
remains difficult to establish a clear pattern with these results, as the behavior of some variables 
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and the outcomes of a few of our equations remain unchanged. These few results could suggest 
that such strategies were not as efficient and impactful as expected. 
 
4.3 Instrumental Variable Analysis 
 
Due to the possible and plausible argument that our primary regression results could be affected 
by endogeneity or reverse causality between CSR performance and firms’ levels of Financial 
Distress, the instrumental variable technique is employed in this study. To do so, a 2SLS model 
is settled, using an instrument that is used for the endogenous variable proxy for CSR 
performance, the ESG Score. Following the approach of Al-Hadi et al. (2007) and Cui et al. 
(2016), the variable chosen was the industry mean for the ESG Score as an instrument for the 
ESG Score. This instrument is considerably reliable, as CSR performance is expected to 
diverge substantially among different industries due to the nature of products produced, 
manufacturing processes, specific regulatory environments, and other generally heterogeneous 
characteristics present across different industries which define their levels of proximity to social 
factors (Waddock and Graves, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Consequently, it is 
expected that a company’s CSR levels will be closely linked to its specific industry 
characteristics. On the other hand, it is anticipated that the mean level of an industry’s CSR 
engagement will not be correlated with Financial Distress. As such this should fulfill the first 
condition for the validity of an instrumental variable which is its relevancy in explaining the 
endogenous variable but only explaining the dependent variable through the endogenous 
variable.  
 
In order to confirm this requirement, a first stage regression for the ESG Score against our 
instrumental variable (an industry’s mean level of CSR engagement) and the rest of our control 
variables is implemented. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 11, confirming that 
the instrumental variable is statistically significant and positive when tested for the ESG Score. 
This means that this variable might be considered as a viable instrument for our purposes. Table 
12 shows the results of our second stage regressions. These results show a positive relationship 
at statistically significant levels for the majority of our regressions, with the exception of 
AltmanZ when the Country dummy variable is introduced. When a comparison with the OLS 
regression (Table 5) is performed however, there is no significant change in terms of the 
significance and type of correlation with our dependent variables. Moreover, a frequently used 
test to assess the viability and strength of the instruments is the F-test that examines the 
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significance of the instruments. The F-statistic across all regressions is greater than 10, which 
is the baseline and recommended minimum value to define whether the instrument is 
sufficiently strong and viable to the study.  Overall, the positive and significant relationship 
between CSR performance and the measures of Financial Distress remains robust even when 
endogeneity is taken into consideration. This supports the argument that endogeneity is not an 
issue within our work, further supporting the notion that higher levels of CSR engagement 
reduce a firm’s likelihood of facing Financial Distress. 
5. Conclusions 
  
This paper examines the relationship between firms’ levels of Financial Distress and Corporate 
Social Responsibility. The main objective of our work is to supplement the existing literature 
with new valuable and unexplored outcomes on the subject, through a particular focus on a 
selection of countries in Southern Europe. Our study has sought to provide insight into the 
relationship between these two concepts in a region that consistently presents higher levels of 
Financial Distress and lower levels of CSR, when compared to other European regions, such as 
central or northern Europe which are known to be top CSR performers.  Based on a sample of 
115 publicity listed and randomly selected Southern European companies covering the 2007–
2017 period, our regression results suggest that positive CSR performance significantly reduces 
a firms’ levels of Financial Distress. Moreover, this study innovates and differentiates itself 
from previous works, through the use of Refinitiv’s ESG Scores as independent variables with 
which to individually asses each of the three distinct CSR dimensions. 
 
Concerning our results, it is relevant to mention that there is a possible negative association 
between CSR performance and Financial Distress. Organizations that engage in positive CSR 
practices and use it as a strategic factor may perceive higher results of AltmanZ, BOS_DIS and 
AC_DIS ratios, and thus that their propensity for entering into situations of Financial Distress 
is reduced. These results are in accordance with stakeholder theory, which argues that increased 
socially responsible performance generates intangible assets such as status, trust, and goodwill, 
thereby enhancing and reinforcing a firm’s financial situation. Furthermore, our research 
examines the influence of the Controversies Score on an overall CSR proxy represented by our 
ESG Combined Score. Based on the results obtained, it has become clear that despite the impact 
of business scandals and negative mediatism, which could cause further damaging effects on a 
company’s ESG overall score, a positive relationship between CSR performance and our 
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measures of Financial Distress remains. This means that the magnitude and influence of our 
Controversies Score are not enough by themselves to rescind the negative relationship between 
CSR and levels of Financial Distress. 
 
Beyond the importance of studying the impact of an overall measure which incorporates all 
aspects related to Corporate Social Responsibility, one of the main motivations for this thesis 
was to gain insight into the individual impact of each of the dimensions of CSR. Therefore we 
sought to develop an in-depth analysis to comprehend whether all three ESG pillars contribute 
to a risk-reduction of a firm’s likelihood of experiencing Financial Distress. The results we 
obtained were at times unexpected in thoroughly interesting and relevant ways, revealing 
important insights and perceptions into leadership decisions. Allowing us to distil the decision-
making process behind deciding which pillar to invest capital, time and effort into. Regarding 
our results, it can be inferred that not all three pillars have the same relationship with measures 
of Financial Distress, as we consistently obtained different coefficients and values for each. Our 
Environmental Score is positively related with AltmanZ, despite the absence of a relevant 
relationship with our other measures of Financial Distress. The analysis of the Social Score 
provided our work with its most unexpected results. A negative association with AltmanZ, 
despite a clear and positive relationship with BOS_DIS and AC_DIS. Finally, the Corporate 
Governance Score returned a positive and relevant relationship for each one of our regressions, 
except when industry fixed effect was employed while using AC_DIS as a dependent variable. 
This information is relevant for corporate decision makers, demonstrating which of the 
dimensions is the most beneficial and impactful to follow as a possible CSR strategy. Indeed, 
the majority of our results were line with the existing literature which defends a sustainable 
combination between CSR and financial objectives. CSR has become a critical prerequisite for 
every corporate strategy (Hoi et al., 2013) in the contemporary business world, combining 
benefits from positive engagement in CSR related activities, with benefits provided by 
subsequent financial gains reducing levels of Financial Distress (Godfrey, 2005). One can 
further infer from our results that the Environmental and Corporate Governance pillars are 
underrepresented in terms of corporate focus and should be further engaged with. Companies 
that take into consideration, among others, issues and challenges concerning environmental 





Furthermore, in order to increase the robustness of the results we obtained and explore whether 
endogeneity was present, an instrumental variables analysis was conducted. The instrument 
chosen was the ESG industry mean, as CSR levels can fluctuate substantially across industries 
due to the nature of products produced, manufacturing processes, specific regulatory 
environments, and other heterogeneous characteristics across different industries which define 
their levels of proximity to social factors (Waddock and Graves, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001). The absence of endogeneity was confirmed and a conclusion thus developing, purporting 
that better levels of CSR engagement can lead to lower levels of Financial Distress, rather than 
the opposite. In summary, the outcome of our work are relevant and significant for investors, 
helping to evaluate risk premiums associated with investments in CSR while providing insight 
into the likelihood that a firm will be exposed to Financial Distress. 
 
In conclusion, Corporate Social Responsibility is no longer a simple business movement or 
trend. An increasing number of consumers want to acquire products and services that satisfy 
their needs, without simultaneously and negatively impacting society and the environment. 
Possessing an immoral reputation regarding social and environmental issues can thus create 
severe negative consequences on the overall profitability and success of a company. Moreover, 
consumer engagement with companies is a factor that has grown exponentially in importance, 
lending greater weight to ethical practices and strategies incorporated by companies. Therefore, 
public influence on business leaders has reached extremely high levels, incentivizing key 
players to incorporate and establish CSR practices and policies into daily business operations 
and thereby generating a positive impact in society. 
 
Although our results provided some interesting findings and conclusions, this study is 
inherently subject to some limitations. The first key limitation is the association within our 
results regarding the individual impact of Social practices on our measures of Financial 
Distress.  The Social Score (SOC Score) parameter demonstrated a surprising positive 
relationship with BOS_DIS and AC_DIS, while simultaneously returning a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with AltmanZ. This suggests that further work is required 
to establish a precise relationship between a firm’s engagement in social activities and levels of 
Financial Distress. Another obstacle regarding our chosen dependent variables, was their very 
selection, as there are a multitude of methods and approaches to measuring a firms’ levels of 
Financial Distress which could not be included in this paper. Following the same reasoning, 
there are several control variables that could potentially, be included such as a dividend yield. 
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However, due to the unfortunate unavailability of the data required for such variable inclusions, 
these had to be discounted. The size of our sample was the one other final obstacle, and potential 
shortcoming of our study. ESG Scores as a proxy for CSR performance is furthermore, a 
relatively recent development, and therefore there is not much information yet on how to use 
these to conduct a more comprehensive study that could provide even deeper and valuable 
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Variables   Definitions  
Dependent Variables  
BOS_DIS 
 
Proxy for Financial Distress from Berger, Ofek and Swary (1996) 




Proxy for Financial Distress from Almeida and Campello (2007) 
calculated as (Cash+0.715*Receivables + 0.547*Inventory + 
0.535*Net PPE)/Total Assets) 
AltmanZ 
  
Altman's (1968) Financial Distress measure to predict bankruptcy, 
calculated as (1.2*Working Capital / Total Assets + 1.4*Retained 
Earnings / Total Assets + 3.3*EBIT / Total Assets + 0.6*Market 
Value of Equity / Book Value of Total Liabilities + 0.99*Sales / 
Total Assets 
Independent Variables  
 
ESG Score  Score received for CSR Performance 
ESGC Score 
 
Score received for CSR Performance, taking into consideration 
Corporate Scandals 
ENV Score  Score received for Environmental Performance 
SOC Score  Score received Social Performance 
GOV Score  Score received for Corporate Governance Performance 
 
Size   The logarithm of the Book Value of Total Assets 
Leverage   Calculated as Total Debt (LTD+STD) divided by Total Assets 
Cash   The ratio of firms' cash holdings per Total Assets 
Liquidity Ratio  Calculated as (Cash + Receivable / Current Liabilities) 
ROA   Ratio of Net Income per Total Assets 
R&D 
  
Ratio of R&D expenses per Total Assets. Not available values for 
R&D are set to zero 
Year   Dummy variables to control for year effects 
IND   Dummy variables to control for industry effects 
Country     Dummy variables to control for country effects 















































BOS_DIS 1265 0.311 0.115 -0.255 3.050 0.231 0.321 0.383 
AC_DIS 1265 0.377 0.125 -0.393 3.231 0.297 0.387 0.471 
ESG score 1265 62.94 16.08 -0.868 3.620 54.09 65.87 74.74 
ESGC score 1265 54.40 17.17 -0.106 2.380 41.11 53.12 68.96 
ENV score 1265 69.66 20.25 -0.993 3.343 59.55 74.16 85.44 
SOC score 1265 67.99 19.69 -0.932 3.616 56.64 71.93 82.49 
GOV score 1265 50.01 20.12 -0.115 2.169 34.30 50.77 66.10 
Size 1265 16.04 1.824 -2.797 24.97 15.17 16.09 17.21 
R&D 1265 0.0116 0.0378 6.508 57.86 0 0 0.0051 
ROA 1265 4.682 15.56 -13.83 459.6 2.180 4.340 6.780 
Cash 1265 0.665 1.545 4.374 25.02 0.0396 0.123 0.471 
Leverage 1265 0.321 0.239 3.512 28.13 0.179 0.290 0.441 
Liquidity Ratio 1265 0.947 0.526 2.427 17.85 0.630 0.860 1.130 
  Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   (13)   (14) 
(1) ESG score 1.00  
(2)ESGC score 0.65 1.00  
(3) ENV score 0.87 0.54 1.00  
(4) SOC score 0.88 0.59 0.73 1.00  
(5) GOV score 0.66 0.44 0.32 0.36 1.00  
(6) AltmanZ 0.05 0.07 0.07 -0.04 0.11 1.00  
(7) BOS_DIS 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.01 1.00  
(8) AC_DIS 0.13 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.86 1.00  
(9) Size 0.49 0.20 0.46 0.47 0.23 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 1.00  
(10) R&D 0.05 0.05 0.11 -0.02 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.09 -0.15 1.00  
(11) ROA 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.43 0.07 0.12 -0.02 -0.03 1.00  
(12) Cash -0.23 -0.08 -0.14 -0.18 -0.21 0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.28 0.05 0.11 1.00  
(13) Leverage -0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.39 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.24 1.00  
(14) Liquidity -0.06 0.04 -0.07 -0.14 0.09 0.28 -0.01 0.15 -0.16 0.15 -0.07 0.11 -0.19 1.00 
Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics. This table reports statistical measures for each variable 
employed in this study. The sample consists of 1265 firm-year observations for 115 firms from 
2007 until 2017. All data is obtained from Refinitiv Datastream.   
















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Altman Z Altman Z BOS_DIS BOS_DIS AC_DIS AC_DIS 
              
ESG Score 0.00468*** 0.00254 0.000932*** 0.000530** 0.00139*** 0.000899*** 
  (0.00149) (0.00189) (0.000266) (0.000243) (0.000287) (0.000256) 
Size -0.0112 0.0495** 0.00212 -0.00513 0.00190 -0.00284 
  (0.0187) (0.0223) (0.00336) (0.00395) (0.00383) (0.00398) 
R&D -2.761*** -3.037*** 0.0254 0.0145 0.235*** 0.212*** 
  (0.862) (0.992) (0.0613) (0.0714) (0.0735) (0.0806) 
ROA 0.0278** 0.0239** 0.000243 0.000356*** 0.000877*** 0.000881*** 
  (0.0118) (0.0111) (0.000260) (9.37e-05) (0.000201) (0.000168) 
Cash 0.0663** 0.0849*** 0.0111*** 0.00465 0.0121*** 0.00677** 
  (0.0289) (0.0276) (0.00254) (0.00298) (0.00301) (0.00312) 
Leverage -1.568*** -1.137*** -0.00502 0.0160 -0.0125 0.0231 
  (0.272) (0.295) (0.0148) (0.0139) (0.0170) (0.0158) 
Liquidity Ratio 0.465*** 0.522*** -0.00338 -0.0233*** 0.0314*** 0.0135** 
  (0.0712) (0.0817) (0.00821) (0.00597) (0.0114) (0.00990) 
Constant 0.962*** -0.318 0.220*** 0.463*** 0.212*** 0.459*** 
  (0.339) (0.360) (0.0524) (0.0611) (0.0596) (0.0660) 
        
Observations 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 
R-squared 0.432 0.591 0.094 0.564 0.124 0.525 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Table 5 – This table divulges the OLS coefficients as well as the corresponding robust standard errors in 
parentheses from the regressions of AltmanZ, BOS_DIS and AC_DIS against the explanatory variable 
overall ESG Score. Year Dummies and Country Dummies are present in all regressions. *, ** and *** 
















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Altman Z Altman Z BOS_DIS BOS_DIS AC_DIS AC_DIS 
              
ESGC Score 0.00280*** 0.00203* 0.000778*** 0.000895*** 0.00114*** 0.00108*** 
  (0.00105) (0.00114) (0.000188) (0.000159) (0.000200) (0.000179) 
Size 0.00217 0.0560*** 0.00431* -0.00539 0.00523* -0.00179 
  (0.0162) (0.0182) (0.00252) (0.00334) (0.00272) (0.00322) 
R&D -2.618*** -2.936*** 0.0468 0.00822 0.268*** 0.227*** 
  (0.851) (0.968) (0.0563) (0.0661) (0.0679) (0.0752) 
ROA 0.0279** 0.0239** 0.000243 0.000344*** 0.000879*** 0.000871*** 
  (0.0118) (0.0111) (0.000261) (8.94e-05) (0.000193) (0.000162) 
Cash 0.0622** 0.0830*** 0.0103*** 0.00424 0.0109*** 0.00608** 
  (0.0285) (0.0274) (0.00249) (0.00294) (0.00290) (0.00304) 
Leverage -1.575*** -1.143*** -0.00696 0.0140 -0.0153 0.0205 
  (0.274) (0.297) (0.0150) (0.0143) (0.0175) (0.0163) 
Liquidity Ratio 0.461*** 0.518*** -0.00484 -0.0246*** 0.0293*** 0.0117*** 
  (0.0702) (0.0804) (0.00782) (0.00574) (0.0107) (0.00922) 
Constant 0.884*** -0.381 0.202*** 0.453*** 0.185*** 0.439*** 
  (0.318) (0.343) (0.0448) (0.0563) (0.0481) (0.0604) 
        
Observations 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 
R-squared 0.430 0.591 0.095 0.573 0.124 0.533 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Table 6 – This table divulges the OLS coefficients as well as the corresponding robust standard errors in 
parentheses from the regressions of AltmanZ, BOS_DIS and AC_DIS against the explanatory variable 
overall ESG Combined Score. Year Dummies and Country Dummies are present in all regressions. *, ** 













  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Altman Z Altman Z BOS_DIS BOS_DIS AC_DIS AC_DIS 
              
ENV Score 0.00800*** 0.00607*** -6.14e-05 -0.000358 0.000484 0.000112 
  (0.00156) (0.00150) (0.000288) (0.000223) (0.000306) (0.000252) 
SOC Score              -0.00669*** -0.0052*** 0.000513* 0.000544*** 0.000650** 0.000746*** 
 (0.00170) (0.00164) (0.000272) (0.000208) (0.000293) (0.000237) 
GOV Score 0.00371*** 0.00209* 0.000591*** 0.000333** 0.000375** 0.000117 
 (0.00101) (0.00111) (0.000170) (0.000148) (0.000184) (0.000170) 
Size -0.00294 0.0505** 0.00203 -0.00477 0.00123 -0.00358 
  (0.0185) (0.0231) (0.00341) (0.00394) (0.00396) (0.00407) 
R&D -3.126*** -3.284*** 0.0397 0.0400 0.231*** 0.214*** 
  (0.859) (0.986) (0.0634) (0.0717) (0.0756) (0.0818) 
ROA 0.0275** 0.0239** 0.000223 0.000343*** 0.000866*** 0.000877*** 
  (0.0117) (0.0111) (0.000253) (9.16e-05) (0.000199) (0.000173) 
Cash 0.0780*** 0.0916**9192* 0.0113*** 0.00477 0.0120*** 0.00625* 
  (0.0293) (0.0279) (0.00261) (0.00305) (0.00309) (0.00321) 
Leverage -1.558*** -1.136*** -0.00680 0.0132 -0.0117 0.0246 
  (0.276) (0.302) (0.0148) (0.0139) (0.0170) (0.0158) 
Liquidity Ratio 0.439*** 0.509*** -0.00523 -0.0243*** 0.0319*** 0.0152*** 
  (0.0702) (0.0841) (0.00840) (0.00599) (0.0118) (0.0106) 
Constant 0.809** -0.373 0.223*** 0.472*** 0.215*** 0.461*** 
  (0.327) (0.365) (0.0527) (0.0618) (0.0611) (0.0666) 
        
Observations 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 
R-squared 0.430 0.591 0.095 0.573 0.124 0.533 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Table 7 – This table divulges the OLS coefficients as well as the corresponding robust standard errors in 
parentheses from the regressions of AltmanZ, BOS_DIS and AC_DIS against the explanatory variables 
Env Score, Soc Score and Gov Score. Year Dummies and Country Dummies are present in all regressions. 















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Altman Z Altman Z BOS_DIS BOS_DIS AC_DIS AC_DIS 
              
ESG Score 0.000719 -0.000556 0.00111*** 0.000514* 0.00149*** 0.000761**  
(0.00172) (0.00185) (0.000324) (0.000300) (0.000338) (0.000311) 
ASTRT*ESG 0.00812*** 0.00646** -0.000363 3.40e-05 -0.000197 0.000289 
 (0.00289) (0.00251) (0.000399) (0.000318) (0.000428) (0.000337) 
Size -0.0169 0.0434* 0.00238 -0.00516 0.00204 -0.00312  
(0.0185) (0.0229) (0.00337) (0.00390) (0.00385) (0.00393) 
R&D -2.836*** -3.071*** 0.0287 0.0143 0.237*** 0.210***  
(0.863) (0.994) (0.0617) (0.0714) (0.0739) (0.0803) 
ROA 0.0277** 0.0239** 0.000248 0.000355*** 0.000879*** 0.000878***  
(0.0119) (0.0112) (0.000263) (9.39e-05) (0.000202) (0.000171) 
Cash 0.0635** 0.0818*** 0.0112*** 0.00464 0.0122*** 0.00663**  
(0.0286) (0.0275) (0.00255) (0.00296) (0.00302) (0.00310) 
Leverage -1.583*** -1.146*** -0.00437 0.0159 -0.0121 0.0227  
(0.270) (0.293) (0.0148) (0.0139) (0.0171) (0.0159) 
Liquidity Ratio 0.464*** 0.523*** -0.00332 -0.0233*** 0.0314*** 0.0135  
(0.0717) (0.0820) (0.00820) (0.00598) (0.0114) (0.00995) 
Constant 1.292*** -0.0568 0.205*** 0.464*** 0.204*** 0.470***  
(0.326) (0.367) (0.0544) (0.0596) (0.0619) (0.0651)        
Observations 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 
R-squared 0.437 0.594 0.095 0.564 0.124 0.525 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Table 8 – Robustness check. This table divulges the OLS coefficients as well as the corresponding robust 
standard errors in parentheses from the regressions of AltmanZ, BOS_DIS and AC_DIS against the 
explanatory variable overall ESG Score and on the dummy variable ASTRT*ESG. Year Dummies and 
















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Altman Z Altman Z BOS_DIS BOS_DIS AC_DIS AC_DIS 
              
ESGC Score -0.000602 -0.000711 0.00107*** 0.00114*** 0.00153*** 0.00133***  
(0.00148) (0.00140) (0.000278) (0.000229) (0.000286) (0.000247) 
ASTRT*ESGC 0.00590*** 0.00475*** -0.000509 -0.000429 -0.000681* -0.000425 
 (0.00208) (0.00175) (0.000359) (0.000277) (0.000376) (0.000303) 
Size -0.000580 0.0534*** 0.00455* -0.00516 0.00555** -0.00156  
(0.0154) (0.0176) (0.00256) (0.00336) (0.00279) (0.00324) 
R&D -2.685*** -2.943*** 0.0525 0.00891 0.276*** 0.227***  
(0.844) (0.961) (0.0572) (0.0667) (0.0684) (0.0755) 
ROA 0.0279** 0.0239** 0.000245 0.000345*** 0.000881*** 0.000872***  
(0.0118) (0.0111) (0.000264) (9.03e-05) (0.000195) (0.000160) 
Cash 0.0607** 0.0812*** 0.0104*** 0.00441 0.0111*** 0.00625**  
(0.0284) (0.0273) (0.00250) (0.00294) (0.00292) (0.00305) 
Leverage -1.588*** -1.152*** -0.00583 0.0148 -0.0138 0.0214  
(0.275) (0.297) (0.0150) (0.0143) (0.0175) (0.0163) 
Liquidity Ratio 0.457*** 0.516*** -0.00456 -0.0244*** 0.0296*** 0.0119  
(0.0700) (0.0800) (0.00785) (0.00571) (0.0108) (0.00922) 
Constant 1.112*** -0.205 0.182*** 0.437*** 0.159*** 0.423***  
(0.304) (0.337) (0.0460) (0.0565) (0.0500) (0.0612)        
Observations 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 
R-squared 0.433 0.593 0.096 0.574 0.126 0.534 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Table 9 – Robustness check. This table divulges the OLS coefficients as well as the corresponding robust 
standard errors in parentheses from the regressions of AltmanZ, BOS_DIS and AC_DIS against the 
explanatory variable overall ESGC Score and on the dummy variable ASTRT*ESGC. Year Dummies and 









  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Altman Z Altman Z BOS_DIS BOS_DIS AC_DIS AC_DIS 
              
ENV Score 0.00575*** 0.00299 -4.21e-05 -0.000504* 0.000491 2.26e-05  
(0.00223) (0.00197) (0.000379) (0.000278) (0.000404) (0.000308) 
SOC Score -0.00576** -0.00335 0.000505 0.000739*** 0.000754** 0.000952*** 
 (0.00232) (0.00211) (0.000357) (0.000268) (0.000373) (0.000301) 
GOV Score 0.00134 0.000337 0.000817*** 0.000277 0.000329 -0.000236 
 (0.00157) (0.00145) (0.000255) (0.000202) (0.000272) (0.000233) 
ASTRT*ENV 0.00461* 0.00637*** -5.53e-05 0.000291 -1.07e-05 0.000210 
 (0.00276) (0.00227) (0.000513) (0.000349) (0.000548) (0.000392) 
ASTRT*SOC -0.00148 -0.00362 -1.09e-05 -0.000413 -0.000215 -0.000411 
 (0.00292) (0.00254) (0.000501) (0.000366) (0.000530) (0.000414) 
ASTRT*GOV 0.00419** 0.00311** -0.000398 0.000109 8.63e-05 0.000623** 
 (0.00191) (0.00153) (0.000321) (0.000240) (0.000346) (0.000279) 
Size -0.00783 0.0462* 0.00232 -0.00464 0.00137 -0.00375  
(0.0186) (0.0240) (0.00342) (0.00388) (0.00401) (0.00403) 
R&D -3.198*** -3.339*** 0.0422 0.0388 0.233*** 0.211***  
(0.854) (0.971) (0.0642) (0.0709) (0.0763) (0.0807) 
ROA 0.0275** 0.0238** 0.000224 0.000343*** 0.000870*** 0.000881***  
(0.0118) (0.0111) (0.000256) (9.20e-05) (0.000200) (0.000174) 
Cash 0.0774*** 0.0909*** 0.0113*** 0.00497 0.0122*** 0.00643**  
(0.0296) (0.0282) (0.00264) (0.00306) (0.00314) (0.00322) 
Leverage -1.579*** -1.155*** -0.00561 0.0122 -0.0119 0.0222  
(0.270) (0.295) (0.0150) (0.0139) (0.0172) (0.0158) 
Liquidity Ratio 0.437*** 0.504*** -0.00527 -0.0247*** 0.0319*** 0.0148  
(0.0708) (0.0841) (0.00840) (0.00595) (0.0119) (0.0106) 
Constant 1.096*** -0.162 0.206*** 0.470*** 0.208*** 0.474***  
(0.318) (0.376) (0.0550) (0.0603) (0.0639) (0.0655)        
Observations 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 
R-squared 0.449 0.601 0.101 0.567 0.129 0.530 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Table 10 – Robustness check. This table divulges the OLS coefficients as well as the corresponding robust 
standard errors in parentheses from the regressions of AltmanZ, BOS_DIS and AC_DIS against the 
individual explanatory variables and the respective dummy variables ASTRT*ENV, ASTRT*SOC, 
ASTRT*GOV. Year Dummies and Country Dummies are present in all regressions. *, ** and *** 
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(0.470) (0.528) (0.470) (0.528) (0.470) (0.528) 
ESG-IND Mean 0.862*** 0.801*** 0.862*** 0.801*** 0.862*** 0.801*** 
 (0.0424) (0.0419) (0.0424) (0.0419) (0.0424) (0.0419) 
R&D 63.91*** 58.73*** 63.91*** 58.73*** 63.91*** 58.73***  
(6.519) (7.407) (6.519) (7.407) (6.519) (7.407) 
ROA 0.0459** 0.0546** 0.0459** 0.0546** 0.0459** 0.0546**  
(0.0196) (0.0220) (0.0196) (0.0220) (0.0196) (0.0220) 
Cash -1.301*** -1.101*** -1.301*** -1.101*** -1.301*** -1.101***  
(0.231) (0.306) (0.231) (0.306) (0.231) (0.306) 
Leverage 1.475 0.199 1.475 0.199 1.475 0.199  
(1.316) (1.339) (1.316) (1.339) (1.316) (1.339) 
Liquidity Ratio 1.101 1.443* 1.101 1.443* 1.101 1.443*  
(0.892) (0.826) (0.892) (0.826) (0.892) (0.826) 
Constant -54.96*** -51.61*** -54.96*** -51.61*** -54.96*** -51.61***  
(8.136) (9.426) (8.136) (9.426) (8.136) (9.426) 
Observations 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 
R-squared 0.438 0.460 0.438 0.460 0.438 0.460 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country No Yes No Yes No Yes 
F-test 54.20 51.86 54.20 51.86 54.20 51.86 
Table 11 – First-Stage IV analysis. This table divulges the OLS coefficients as well as the corresponding 
robust standard errors in parentheses from the regressions of ESG Score against the explanatory variable 
overall ESG-IND Mean Score. Year Dummies and Country Dummies are present in all regressions. *, ** 

















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Altman Z Altman Z BOS_DIS BOS_DIS AC_DIS AC_DIS 
              
ESG Score* 0.00631** 0.00249 0.00446*** 0.00508*** 0.00488*** 0.00553*** 
  (0.00305) (0.00358) (0.000599) (0.000640) (0.000618) (0.000675) 
Size -0.0245 -0.00217 -0.0181*** -0.0149*** -0.0179*** -0.0151** 
  (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.00550) (0.00548) (0.00589) (0.00593) 
R&D -2.921*** -2.651*** -0.236*** -0.183** -0.0159 0.0271 
  (0.900) (0.874) (0.0902) (0.0854) (0.0968) (0.0936) 
ROA 0.0272** 0.0280** 0.000212 -8.22e-06 0.000865*** 0.000627*** 
  (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.000220) (0.000253) (0.000217) (0.000221) 
Cash 0.0497* 0.0645** 0.00628*** 0.0146*** 0.00747*** 0.0156*** 
  (0.0260) (0.0284) (0.00227) (0.00314) (0.00255) (0.00359) 
Leverage -1.501*** -1.568*** 0.0153 -0.00535 0.00812 -0.0128 
  (0.253) (0.270) (0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0159) (0.0168) 
Liquidity Ratio 0.460*** 0.467*** 0.00155 -0.00607 0.0363*** 0.0287** 
  (0.0677) (0.0708) (0.0106) (0.00948) (0.0133) (0.0123) 
Constant 1.139*** 0.942*** 0.355*** 0.257*** 0.342*** 0.249*** 
  (0.371) (0.333) (0.0826) (0.0830) (0.0884) (0.0901) 
        
Observations 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 
R-squared 0.422 0.431 - - - - 
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 12 – IV analysis. This table divulges the OLS coefficients as well as the corresponding robust 
standard errors in parentheses from the regressions of AltmanZ, BOS_DIS and AC_DIS against the 
explanatory variable overall ESG Score. Year Dummies and Country Dummies are present in all 
regressions. *, ** and *** represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
